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Abstract
In the present paper we provide an explanation of why priva-
tization may attract foreign investors willing to enter a regional
market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less ag-
gressive competitor since profit-maximizing output is lower than
the welfare-maximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare
generally decreases. We also investigate tax/subsidy competition
for FDI and put forward its potentially positive role. On the one
hand, it may reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-
attracting privatization. On the other hand, it may prevent a
welfare-reducing investment by the foreign firm. This shows that
privatization and fiscal policies may be either alternative or com-
plementary instruments depending on the government’s objective
(i.e., country’s attractiveness for foreign investors and domestic
welfare).
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1 Introduction
One of the most well documented trends in the world economy over
the last decades has been the rise in foreign direct investments (FDI)
by multinational enterprises (MNEs). At an aggregate level, the em-
pirical evidence indicates that, due to the existence of trade costs, the
growth of FDI in the last 15 years of the 20th century far outpaced
that of international trade among industrialized countries.1 Moreover,
because of the widely held advantages of receiving FDI (e.g., cheaper or
higher-quality goods for domestic consumers, technological spillovers to
domestic producers, job creation, etc.), governments at different levels
are prone to offer MNEs countervailing incentives to attract their invest-
ments. Competition mostly takes place between countries belonging to
the same economic or geographical area (e.g., Latin America, South-
East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and so on).2 In spite of that,
FDI by foreign MNEs can be an issue to the extent that foreign firms
investing in a country often operate in the same sector as some incum-
bent local firm, which is, in some cases, a public enterprise.3 In recent
years, however, parallel to the massive increase in FDI, privatization
has become an important tool of industrial restructuring in all parts
of the world: “Since 1990, European governments have sold more than
$450 billion worth of state assets in many different sectors, including
the banking, insurance, telecommunication and automobile industries.
Many countries are also announcing substantial forthcoming privatiza-
tion” (Norba¨ck and Persson, 2005, p. 635). And privatization waves
Pestieau, Pierre M. Picard, Maria Eugenia Sanin, Jacques Thisse, Hylke Vanden-
bussche, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia Vergari, Ian Wooton as well as participants
at the University of Bologna, at the 3rd CORE Summer School on Heterogeneity, at
the 9th ETSG Annual Conference, at the ASSET 2007 Annual Meeting, at the 35th
EARIE Conference, and at the SIE 2008 Annual Conference for valuable comments
and suggestions. The first author gratefully acknowledges financial support from
Marco Polo grant, University of Bologna. The second author from Department of
Economics, University of Salerno.
1See, e.g., Markusen (1995), Markusen and Venables (1998), and Barba Navaretti
and Venables (2004).
2For an overview of this issue, see Oman (2001).
3For instance, in the Norwegian oil industry, the state-owned Statoil competes
with two MNEs, Esso Norge and Norske Shell.
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are certainly not confined to the European Union.4
The primary aim of our work is to analyze the effects of privatization
on attractiveness and welfare of a potentially FDI-receiving country. We
also investigate how privatization and tax/subsidy policies may inter-
act when countries compete to attract FDI. To this end, we consider a
foreign-owned MNE willing to enter a regional market which is already
served by a welfare-maximizing public firm. We define the attractive-
ness of a country as a relative concept: it is a comparison from the
foreign firm’s perspective between the advantages of investing in that
country rather than elsewhere and takes into account both operating
profits and taxes paid to or subsidies received from the host country.
By privatization, we mean a transfer in ownership rights from the gov-
ernment to domestic private investors, which simply translates into a
change in the firm’s objective function.
The issues we are interested in are related to the theoretical litera-
ture on mixed oligopoly. The latter has generally focused on the optimal
strategies of the public firm, the characterization of market equilibria
and the effects of privatization by adapting the standard models of
oligopolistic competition to the welfare-maximizing behaviour of public
firms.5 More recently, closer attention has been paid to international
mixed oligopoly given that the public firm’s behaviour is sensitive to
the nationality of its private competitor (Fjell and Pal, 1996; Fjell and
Heywood, 2002). In particular, some work has been devoted to the
analysis of instruments, such as production subsidies, that are alterna-
tive to direct public provision (Pal and White, 1998; Sepahvand, 2004);
to the study of partial privatization and optimum tariffs (Chao and Yu,
2006); or to make the timing of competition endogenous (Cornes and
Sepahvand, 2003; Matsumura, 2003). Other contributions (Norba¨ck and
Persson, 2004; 2005) have studied competition between foreign and do-
mestic private firms as potential buyers of state-owned assets which are
sold at an auction during the privatization process.
In this paper, we apply the analysis of international mixed oligopoly
to a context where two active governments seek to attract FDI by a for-
4In the 1990s, e.g., Russia privatized its aircraft industry, Colombia its state-
owned automobile maker Colombia Automotriz, and Argentina pursued a policy of
selective privatization.
5See Rees (1984), Bo¨s (1986), de Fraja and Delbono (1989), and Beato and Mas-
Colell (1984).
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eign firm from a third country. Our theoretical framework builds on the
literature about policy competition for FDI. Namely, on those contribu-
tions considering imperfect product market competition, country-size
asymmetry, and intra-regional trade costs. This strand of the litera-
ture grows out of the paper by Haufler and Wooton (1999) (henceforth
H&W), which analyzes competition between two countries of unequal
size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. Both countries are
willing to offer a subsidy to the firm but, in equilibrium, the large coun-
try wins the competition for FDI since the firm prefers locating in the
big market in order to save on trade costs. Moreover, if the market-
size difference is great enough, the large country may be able to levy a
positive lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profit. Bjorvatn and Eckel
(2006) modify H&W’s set-up by introducing a private firm - in the big
country - which competes with the foreign investor on the regional mar-
ket. As a consequence, the FDI decision is driven by a trade-off between
the advantage of locating in the big market (market size effect) and the
benefit of being a monopolist in the small market (competition effect).
The intensity of policy competition and the resulting equilibrium pol-
icy (i.e., a subsidy or a tax) depend on the relative location advantages
offered by the two countries. An interesting result is that aggregate
welfare (the sum of regional welfare and the investor’s profits) rises
whenever the introduction of policy competition changes the investor’s
location decision. In our model, we follow Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006)
and postulate that the big country already hosts an incumbent firm
serving the regional market. However, we assume that the competitor
of the foreign investor is not a private firm but a welfare-maximizing
and relatively inefficient public firm.
Our main contribution is to show that privatization always makes the
big country more attractive from the foreign investor’s perspective. In
fact, it turns the formerly-public incumbent into a less aggressive com-
petitor for the MNE since profit-maximizing output is always lower than
the welfare-maximizing one. Such a result is important for empirical re-
search on this issue since it provides a direction of causality between
privatization and FDI. Indeed, the FDI-attracting property of privatiza-
tion finds support in several empirical studies. Carstensen and Toubal
(2004) and Merlevede and Schoors (2005) point out the positive impact
of privatization on FDI into the Central and Eastern European transi-
3
tion economies, irrespective of whether privatization sales are opened to
foreign investors or not. More specifically, Trevin˜o et al. (2002a,b) focus
on the effects of domestic privatization. They find a significant positive
impact of the value of privatization less FDI in privatized companies on
the FDI inflows to seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) during the 1988-1999
and 1988-1992 periods, respectively. Their results confirm the previous
contribution by Hartenek (1995) about Argentina, who contends that
privatization programs have given foreign companies more opportuni-
ties to invest within host Latin American countries. The speculative
argument typically used to account for the FDI-attracting property of
privatization is that the latter sends a signal of a more favourable eco-
nomic environment to potential foreign investors. Our simple model
puts forward an alternative micro-founded explanation based on mar-
ket competition: privatization leads the domestic firm to reduce output
because of the change in its objective, and leaves larger profit opportu-
nities to foreign investors willing to enter the market.
In spite of that, for the very same reason, consumers are adversely
affected and social welfare decreases as well, unless the incumbent firm
is too inefficient. This negative effect on welfare may be mitigated in
the presence of tax/subsidy competition. Following privatization, the
relative advantage to the MNE from investing in the big country in-
creases by so much that the its government can tax away some of the
profits without inducing the MNE to prefer investing in the other coun-
try. In this way, the government optimally balances attractiveness and
welfare in the new international private duopoly setting. Nevertheless,
the overall effect of an FDI-attracting privatization is always negative
if the domestic firm is efficient enough.
Following an independent line of research, Mukherjee and Suetrong
(2009) analyze the relationship between privatization and FDI in a
model in which a foreign firm has to decide how to serve another coun-
try’s market (i.e., FDI or exports) in the presence of a public incumbent.
The government is able to strategically manipulate the objective of the
domestic firm by changing the weights attached to welfare and profits.
By increasing the weight attached to the latter (i.e., by increasing the
share of private ownership in the domestic incumbent), the foreign firm
may be induced to prefer FDI to exports and this, in turn, may increase
4
welfare. It is well-known from the standard analysis of the second-best
theory (Bo¨s, 1986; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956–1957; Rees, 1984) that
this amounts to give to a welfare-maximizing firm the leadership in a
Stackelberg game with the foreign firm acting as the follower.6 In other
words, instead of giving to the government the strategic advantage of
manipulating the objective function of the domestic firm through par-
tial privatization, the same outcome can be achieved if the government
is given the strategic advantage to directly choose the quantity pro-
duced by a fully state-owned firm. In our paper, we choose not to give
any strategic advantage to the players and firms are assumed to play a
simultaneous quantity-setting game.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
main trade-off at work in our model in the simplest possible set-up.
In Section 3, we describe the basic two-stage game that will be used
to analyze the investment decision of the MNE. In Section 4, we solve
the second stage of the game in which market competition between the
MNE and the incumbent firm occurs, while in Section 5, we investi-
gate the first stage of the game. Section 6 presents the main results
of the paper on the effects of privatization on FDI-attractiveness and
welfare. In Section 7, we introduce tax/subsidy competition between
countries and analyze the interaction between privatization and policy
competition. In Section 8, we discuss the robustness of our results to
some specific issues. Finally, Section 9 summarizes the main conclusions
emerging from our work. All computations and proofs are gathered in
the Appendix.
2 A simple illustration of the attractiveness-
welfare trade-off
Consider a region composed by two countries (A and B) of different
market size, where demands for a final good are given by
QA = 1− pA and QB = n (1− pB )
6See also Matsumura (1998) about the limitations of the convex combination
approach to identify the objective function of a partially privatized firm.
7We get qualitatively similar results if we follow the model by Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) and allow for endogenous timing in the order of moves by firms. We
rely on Cournot competition to facilitate the exposition.
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with n > 1 and Qj and pj denoting the total quantity and the price to
consumers on country j’s market, respectively.
The big country B already hosts a welfare-maximizing public firm
producing a non-exportable final good for its domestic residents. A
foreign profit-maximizing firm producing the same good is willing to
make an investment in the region and has to choose the most profitable
country in which to locate its production unit.8 Its decision depends on
the difference in market size, which works in favour of the big country,
and on the degree of competition, which favours the small country.
We further assume that the public and the foreign firm have the same
constant marginal production cost, c < 1, and, if investment takes place
in B, Cournot competition occurs.
The monopoly profits from investing in the small country are equal
to ΠA = (1−c)
2
4 .
9 By contrast, the profits the foreign firm can realize
by investing in B are nil since the public firm produces a quantity
QB = n (1− c) such that price equals marginal cost and there is no room
for competitors. In such a situation, the foreign firm always invests in
the small country and social welfare in the big country - the unweighted
sum of consumer surplus, CS, and domestic firm’s profits, Π0 - is given
by WB =
n(1−c)2
2 .
Suppose now that the public firm is sold to domestic private in-
vestors. Privatization changes the firm’s objective from welfare to profit
maximization. As a result, if the foreign firm invests in country B, it
earns private duopoly Cournot profits equal to ΠB = n(1−c)
2
9 , which
exceed the monopoly profits from investing in A as long as n > 94 .
Hence, privatization increases the attractiveness of the big country as
it may now be possible that the foreign firm chooses to invest in B.
However, such an FDI-attracting privatization policy always decreases
social welfare. Indeed, it is immediate to show that
WP
B
= CSP + ΠP
0
=
2n (1− c)2
9
+
n (1− c)2
9
=
n (1− c)2
3
< WB =
n (1− c)2
2
.
8For simplicity, we assume that the foreign firm has some financial constraints
preventing it from making more than one investment.
9Throughout the paper, we will use the superscript to indicate the country where
the MNE locates its production facility.
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In what follows, we will extend such a simple model along several
lines. We will let the public firm be as efficient as or less efficient than
the foreign firm. We will also consider exportable final goods in the
presence of intra-regional trade costs. In spite of that, the trade-off for
the big country between attractiveness and welfare will generally be at
work.
3 The model
We consider a firm from a third-country (we will refer to it as firm 1, the
MNE or the foreign firm) which has to decide in which of two countries
to invest (i.e., to locate a production plant) in order to provide some
final good to the consumers of the whole region. We postulate that the
markets of the two countries differ in size and that an incumbent public
firm already serves the entire regional market from the big country.
Firstly, we analyze the effects of privatization on the investment
decision of the foreign firm and on welfare. To this end, we compare
the outcome of two games, which differ depending on whether - before
the game starts - the incumbent on the regional market is a public
welfare-maximizing or a private profit-maximizing firm. The model can
then be described as a two-stage game of perfect information where, in
the first stage, the foreign firm decides in which country to locate its
production plant, and in the second stage, firms compete in quantities
on the two markets.
Secondly, we introduce tax/subsidy competition for FDI between the
two countries and analyze how fiscal and privatization policies may af-
fect the investment decision of the MNE and welfare. This is done by
introducing a pre-play stage to the two-stage game of perfect informa-
tion outlined above. In this stage, the two countries post a irreversible
offer in terms of lump-sum tax/subsidy to the MNE in order to attract
its investment. As before, the analysis of privatization is a compara-
tive statics exercise contrasting the outcome of two three-stage games,
one with a public welfare-maximizing firm and the other with a private
profit-maximizing firm.
As we will see below, each country’s market can be characterized by
different competitive structures depending on the location decision of
the MNE, on the production choices of the two firms, and on the nature
7
of the incumbent firm.
The basic set-up
The markets of the two countries are of unequal size. Namely, in line
with Haufler and Wooton (1999), we assume that a single consumer
lives in country A and n ≥ 1 identical consumers live in country B,
which, for n > 1, represents the “big” market for the final good. In the
status quo ante, no production takes place in the small country, whereas
a welfare-maximizing public firm (firm 0) operates in the big country.10
The incumbent firm and the foreign MNE produce and sell the same
product and compete a` la Cournot on the two markets. In particular,
the incumbent firm is assumed to be less efficient than the MNE, i.e.,
it produces the final good at a higher marginal cost, c0 > c1 ≥ 0,
with ci denoting the constant marginal production cost of firm i =
0, 1. Moreover, it serves the small market through exports by incurring
positive per unit trade costs, τ > 0. The MNE, instead, has to bear a
fixed cost F > 0 to establish a production plant in either country since
trade costs associated with exporting from its residence country to the
region are assumed to be prohibitively high compared to trade costs
within the region (τ).11
The marginal cost of serving a market thus depends on the efficiency
of the firm and on its location. When the final good is produced and
sold locally, the marginal cost is given by ci , i = 0, 1; by contrast, when
the firm exports the final good to the other country, the marginal cost
is higher since it also includes intra-regional trade costs, τ . The latter
separate the two markets so that consumer prices for the same final
good will be different in the two countries.12 But since the two firms
10We do not exclude the symmetric-country case (n = 1). By contrast, we do
not consider the case where the public firm operates in the small country. This, in
fact, leads to the trivial conclusion that the MNE always prefers to invest in the big
country with no local competitor.
11As an example, we can think of a German multinational which has to pick one
location between Argentina and Chile where to build a production plant with the
purpose of servicing the consumers of this Latin American region. In what follows,
we assume that the fixed cost F is symmetric across countries and so high that it
will never be profitable for the MNE to pay it twice but not so high to make FDI in
the favourite country unprofitable.
12Several empirical studies show that the market segmentation assumption is con-
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sell a homogeneous good, its consumer price in a given market will be
the same irrespective of where production takes place.13
Denoting by qij the quantity of the final good sold by firm i on
country j’s market (i = 0, 1, j = A,B), we can write the total cost
functions of firm 0 and firm 1 as follows:
C0 (q0A , q0B ) = c0 (q0A + q0B ) + τq0A (1)
C1 (q1A , q1B ) = F + c1 (q1A + q1B ) + τ (IAq1A + IBq1B ) (2)
where Ij = 0 if FDI goes to j and Ij = 1 otherwise.
We assume that firms face the following linear demands in the two
markets:
QA(pA) = α− pA and QB (pB ) = n (α− pB )
where Qj = q0j + q1j and pj are the total quantity and the price to
consumers on country j’s market, respectively. Production and trade
costs are assumed not to exceed the consumers’ maximal willingness to
pay, i.e., c0 , c1 , τ ≤ α. In addition, to keep our analysis as simple as
possible, we normalize firm 1’s marginal production cost to 0 (c1 = 0)
and set α = 1, so that c0 , τ ∈ [0, 1].
The incumbent firm
When the incumbent in the big country is a public firm, its objective is
to maximize social welfare in B, which corresponds to the unweighted
sum of domestic consumer surplus and firm 0’s profits:
WB (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = CSB (QB ) + Π0 (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B )
where
CSB (QB ) =
∫ Q
B
0
pB (s)ds− pB (QB ) (q0B + q1B )
and
Π0 (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = pB (QB )q0B + pA(QA)q0A − C0 (q0A , q0B ) .
sistent with the price-setting behaviour of firms even within the European Union,
where, in principle, there should be no official barriers to cross-border trade. See,
for instance, Head and Mayer (2000), Haskel and Wolf (2001), and Lutz (2004).
13In this respect, our model is very similar to the “reciprocal dumping” model of
Brander and Krugman (1983) whose focus is, however, on the welfare effects of trade.
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The objective function of the public firm can then be rewritten as
WB (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) =∫ Q
B
0
pB (s)ds− pB (QB )q1B + pA(QA)q0A − C0 (q0A , q0B ) (3)
from which it is evident that welfare in country B increases with the
overall quantity sold on the domestic market - due to the lower consumer
price - and decreases with the revenues the MNE collects by serving that
same market.
Firms compete on quantities in the two markets. The linearity of
costs allows them to choose output for one country’s market indepen-
dently of that for the other. Hence, when it comes to welfare maxi-
mization, it is straightforward to show that the public firm’s reaction
functions are given by:14
qG
0A
= max
{
1− c0 − τ
2
− q1A
2
, 0
}
and qG
0B
= max {n (1− c0) , 0} .
The public firm’s output choice for its domestic market is constant and
independent of the MNE’s quantity decision. On the other hand, its
reaction function on the foreign market has the usual downward slope.
This follows from the fact that the public firm behaves as a welfare
maximizer on the domestic market only, while it seeks to maximize
profits on country A’s market.
Privatization of the incumbent firm changes its objective function. In
particular, we suppose that the government of country B privatizes the
public firm by selling all of the shares to domestic investors/residents.
Then, if privatization per se does not imply a decrease in production
costs, the only difference with respect to the before-privatization sce-
nario is the nature of the incumbent firm in B. The privatized firm,
indeed, will seek to maximize just its profits, instead of country B’s wel-
fare. Hence, it is easy to derive the privatized firm’s reaction functions,
14In what follows, we will use the superscripts G and P to indicate output choices
when the incumbent is a public or a privatized firm, respectively.
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which are given by:
qP
0A
= qG
0A
= max
{
1− c0 − τ
2
− q1A
2
, 0
}
and
qP
0B
= max
{
n (1− c0)
2
− q1B
2
, 0
}
.
While the public firm acts as a profit maximizer just in country A, the
privatized firm maximizes its profits in both markets, so that its output
choice for the domestic market is no longer independent of the MNE’s
behaviour. Namely, quantities of the two firms are strategic substitutes
in the two markets. Moreover, the privatized firm always earns nonneg-
ative profits in each country - otherwise, it does not produce for that
market.
The foreign firm
The foreign firm is interested in maximizing the profits it may earn from
investing in the region. Since the latter depend on where it locates its
production plant, the objective function of the MNE can be written as
follows:
Πj ≡ Πj
1
(q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = pA (QA) q1A + pB (QB ) q1B −C1 (q1A , q1B ) .
(4)
Using the total cost function (2) and maximizing (4) with respect to
the quantities supplied in the two markets, we easily derive the reaction
functions of the MNE
q1A = max
{
1− IAτ
2
− q0A
2
, 0
}
and
q1B = max
{
n
1− IBτ
2
− q0B
2
, 0
}
(5)
where IA = 0 and IB = 1 if FDI occurs in country A, while the reverse
is true if FDI occurs in country B.
4 Market competition
The equilibrium outcome of competition on the product market is af-
fected by whether the incumbent in the big country is a public or a
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privatized firm and by the location choice of the MNE. Therefore, in
order to solve the last stage of the game, we have to consider four cases:
(a) no privatization and FDI in country A; (b) no privatization and
FDI in country B; (c) privatization and FDI in country A; and (d)
privatization and FDI in country B.
Different market configurations (private or public monopoly versus
duopoly) may arise depending on the values of c0 and τ . By contrast,
the difference in market size, n, has no impact on the structure of the
markets.15
In what follows, we will solve for equilibrium quantities in the above-
mentioned four cases and we will denote by qzk
ij
the equilibrium quantity
produced by firm i (i = 0, 1) for the market of country j when FDI
occurs in country k (j, k = A,B) and the incumbent is a public or a
privatized firm (z = G,P ).
(a) No privatization and FDI in country A
In the presence of a public welfare-maximizing firm in country B, if the
MNE invests, i.e., locates its production facility, in the small country,
equilibrium quantities are given by:
qGA
0A
= max
{
1−2c0−2τ
3 , 0
}
and qGA
1A
= 13 (1 + c0 + τ)
in country A,
qGA
0B
= n (1− c0) and qGA1B = max
{
n(c0−τ)
2 , 0
}
in country B,
where qGA
0A
≥ 0 and qGA
1B
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−2τ2 and c0 ≥ τ , respec-
tively.
Since the MNE enters the regional market and produces in loco,
exporting to the small country becomes less profitable for the public
firm. In particular, when production and/or trade costs are too high,
the latter stops exporting, thereby leaving monopoly power in the small
market to the MNE. However, by locating in A, the MNE has to incur
15This follows from the assumption that all consumers are identical and thus be-
have in the same way in equilibrium. An additional consumer buys the good from
the two firms in the same proportion as the other consumers did beforehand. Then
the market structure is not sensitive to the number of consumers (n+1 in our model)
and only the level of profits is affected.
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trade costs to service country B’s consumers. Hence, exporting is going
to be a viable option to it whenever the cost of supplying the final good
to the big country’s market does not exceed the production cost of the
local public firm, i.e., for τ ≤ c0 . If this were not the case, consumers
of the big country will continue to be served by a public monopoly.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 depicts all the possible market configurations
in the parameter space (τ, c0). If, for instance, c0 > τ and c0 <
1−2τ
2
simultaneously hold, both firms sell positive quantities in both markets.
But if the second condition does not hold, FDI in the small country will
drive the public firm out of that market.
Figure 1: Market configurations
(b) No privatization and FDI in country B
If the MNE chooses to invest in the big country, which already hosts a
13
public welfare-maximizing firm, equilibrium quantities are given by:
qGB
0A
= max
{
1−2c0−τ
3 , 0
}
and qGB
1A
= 13 (1 + c0 − τ)
in country A,
qGB
0B
= qGA
0B
= n (1− c0) and qGB1B =
nc0
2
in country B,
where qGB
0A
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−τ2 .
As in case (a), entry in the regional market by the foreign firm re-
duces the profitability of exporting to the small country for the incum-
bent. However, since both firms will incur trade costs to serve country
A’s market, competition will be milder than before. The public firm
will then find it profitable to export for higher values of c0 . Note also
that, by locating its production facility in country B, the MNE will
always profitably serve both countries’ markets despite the competition
of the public incumbent.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 represents the two possible market configura-
tions in this case: Cournot competition always occurs on country B’s
market, while we observe either a monopoly by the foreign MNE or a
Cournot duopoly on country A’s market.
(c) Privatization and FDI in country A
Privatization changes the behaviour of the incumbent firm on the big
country’s market. In the presence of a privatized profit-maximizing
firm in country B, if the MNE invests in the small country, equilibrium
quantities are given by:
qPA
0A
= qGA
0A
and qPA
1A
= qGA
1A
in country A,
qPA
0B
= max
{
n(1−2c0+τ)
3 , 0
}
and qPA
1B
= max
{
n(1+c0−2τ)
3 , 0
}
in country B,
where, as before, qPA
0A
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−2τ2 . In addition, qPA0B ≥ 0
and qPA
1B
≥ 0 if and only if c0 ≤ 1+τ2 and c0 ≥ 2τ − 1, respectively.
While no change occurs on country A’s market, the incumbent firm,
following privatization, may no longer find it profitable to compete with
the MNE even on its domestic market. For low production costs, the
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privatized incumbent will keep producing on both markets. For inter-
mediate production costs, it will stop exporting to the small market -
just like a public incumbent would have done anyway. But if produc-
tion costs are large enough, the privatized incumbent will be induced
to exit both markets, where it will be replaced by the foreign MNE. In
spite of that, if trade costs are sufficiently high relative to the incum-
bent’s productions costs, investing in A may prevent the MNE from
serving country B, thereby leaving monopoly power on that market to
the privatized firm.
Panel (c) of Figure 1 illustrates the different possibilities. If, for
instance, c0 >
1+τ
2 , FDI in the region ensures monopoly power to the
foreign firm in both markets. By contrast, for any c0 < 2τ−1, investing
in A makes exporting unprofitable for the privatized firm but ensures
it monopoly on the big country’s market.
(d) Privatization and FDI in country B
If the MNE, following privatization, chooses to invest in the big country,
equilibrium quantities are given by:
qPB
0A
= qGB
0A
and qPB
1A
= qGB
1A
in country A,
qPB
0B
= max
{
n(1−2c0)
3 , 0
}
and qPB
1B
=
n(1+c0)
3 in country B,
where qPB
0A
≥ 0 and qPB
0B
≥ 0 as long as c0 ≤ 1−τ2 and c0 ≤ 12 , respec-
tively.
As in case (c), entry of the relatively more efficient MNE in the re-
gional market makes domestic production less profitable for the priva-
tized firm. Due to the presence of positive trade costs, such an argument
is even stronger for exports. Hence, if the privatized firm is not efficient
enough, it will be forced to stop production in order to avoid losses, and
the MNE will behave as a monopolist on both markets.
Panel (d) of Figure 1 depicts the possible market configurations in
this last case.
5 Investment decision of the MNE
Moving backwards in the game tree, we now turn to the analysis of
the FDI choice by the foreign MNE. At this stage, the latter chooses in
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which country to locate its production plant with the purpose of serving
the whole regional market. The MNE knows whether it will face a
public or a privatized incumbent and anticipates market configurations
and equilibrium profits arising in the last stage of the game.
In order to take its investment decision, the MNE compares its profits
from investing in country A and B. Whenever ΠA = ΠB, the MNE is
indifferent between investing in either country, and the gain in profits
on A’s market of locating in A over B exactly compensates the gain in
profits on B’s market of locating in B over A. Indeed:
ΠA = ΠB ⇐⇒ piA
A
+ piA
B
= piB
A
+ piB
B
⇐⇒ piA
A
− piB
A
= piB
B
− piA
B
where pik
j
stands for the MNE’s profits on j’s market when FDI goes to
country k (j, k = A,B).
When the two countries have the same market size (n = 1), the
presence of an incumbent firm - although less efficient than the MNE
- is a strong disincentive to invest in country B. Intuitively, as there
exist positive trade costs separating the two markets, the MNE prefers
to locate as distant as possible from its competitor. In particular, when
the incumbent is a public welfare-maximizing firm, the foreign firm will
always invest in country A.
In general, however, the investment decision of the foreign MNE is
driven by three effects. The market size effect captures the relative
asymmetry between the two countries’ markets: a larger n increases
the relative profitability of investing in the big country and FDI is more
likely to take place there. The cost effect reflects the efficiency of the
incumbent firm: as intuition suggests, the higher c0 , the higher the
attractiveness of country B since the MNE faces a weaker competitor
on the big market. The competition effect is related to τ . Bjorvatn and
Eckel (2006, p. 1896) claim that “the higher are the trade costs, the more
protected are the national markets from international competition, and
the more important is the competition argument in favour of location in
[the small country]”. But this is not always true in our model. Higher
trade costs, indeed, can increase the relative profitability of investing in
the big country. If the incumbent is inefficient enough and/or country
B’s market is sufficiently larger than country A’s one, the MNE may
prefer to locate as close as possible to consumers in B since the profit
loss in B from investing in A would exceed that in A from investing
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in B. Therefore, the effect of τ on the FDI decision is ambiguous and
depends on the values of c0 and n and on the market configurations
prevailing in the two countries.
Figure 2 illustrates the investment decision of the MNE in the param-
eter space (τ, c0) for selected values of the size-asymmetry parameter
n (i.e., n = 1, 2, 3) when the incumbent is a public welfare-maximizing
firm. It essentially defines, for a given n, the values of the parameters
c0 and τ such that the MNE chooses to invest in one of the two coun-
tries anticipating market configurations and equilibrium profits arising
in the last stage of the game. The bold line in the central and in the
right panel of the Figure identifies the indifference condition, i.e., the
locus where ΠA = ΠB.16
First of all, it is evident that an increase in market asymmetry, i.e.,
a larger n, raises the profitability of locating a production plant in B.
As for the cost effect, the more inefficient the incumbent firm, the more
profitable investing in B: for given values of n > 1 and τ ∈ [0, 1],
indeed, as we let c0 increase from zero, the MNE eventually prefers
locating in B over A. Finally, the competition effect crucially depends
on the market configurations resulting from the FDI choice. Consider,
for example, the right panel of Figure 2 - which depicts a situation where
the difference in market size is sufficiently large (n = 3) - and take a
value of c0 just below 1/2 and τ = 0. In this case, Cournot competition
always occurs in both markets and the competition effect works in the
intuitive direction suggested by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). The same
occurs when trade costs are sufficiently high. For intermediate values of
τ , instead, the competition effect is such that higher trade costs make
country B relatively more attractive. This happens in spite of the fact
that investing in A would guarantee monopoly profits to the MNE on
that market. But the consequent profit loss on the big market gets
larger for higher trade costs and eventually exceeds the gain on the
small one. Hence, the foreign firm prefers to locate as close as possible
to consumers in the big country.
While the effects of privatization on the attractiveness of country B
will be discussed in the next Section, it is easy to show that, with a
16The indifference locus has been derived - and then plotted - by comparing profits
from investing in A and in B for each of the possible market configurations. See the
Appendix for details.
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Figure 2: FDI decision with a public incumbent in B for n = 1, 2, 3
privatized incumbent, the impact of n, c0 and τ on the FDI decision are
qualitatively equivalent to the case of a public incumbent. In fact, the
larger the asymmetry in market size and/or the lower the efficiency of
the incumbent firm, the more profitable will be to invest in B. Similarly,
the sign of the competition effect is related to the market structure
arising from the location choice.
6 The effects of privatization
In this Section we compare the outcome of the game with a public
incumbent and the one of the game with the privatized firm.
Firstly we will look at the effect on the attractiveness of the country:
does privatization increase MNE’s profitability of investing in country
B? The answer is unambiguous and given in Proposition 1.
Secondly, we will look at the effects on Country B’s consumer surplus
and welfare. Do consumers benefit from privatization? What is the
overall effect on welfare? Proposition 2 deals with these issues.
In general, privatization decreases the importance of the cost effect
relative to the market size effect in driving the investment decision of
the MNE. On the big market, the privatized firm produces as long as
its profits are nonnegative and it clearly represents a much weaker com-
petitor for the MNE than the public firm, which either runs losses or
realizes zero profits from sales. In the small country, instead, privati-
zation does not affect the intensity of market competition. Hence, the
cost effect is less likely to discourage the MNE from investing in the big
country than before privatization, and higher values of n dramatically
increase the attractiveness of country B because of the market size ef-
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fect. In particular, if the privatized firm is too inefficient (c0 >
1
2), the
MNE always invests in the big country as this allows it to be a monop-
olist on both markets and to serve the relatively large market without
incurring any trade costs.
Figure 3: Impact of privatization on the FDI decision for n = 1, 2, 3
Figure 3, shows the effect of privatization on the investment decision
of the MNE. The grey areas represent the parameter space (τ, c0) where
privatization changes the decision of the MNE and induces it to invest in
country B. The impact of privatization on the attractiveness of the big
country is evident from this Figure and consistent with our discussion
above, so that we can state
Proposition 1 Privatization always increases the attractiveness of the
big country.
Privatization of the formerly-public firm makes it more likely that
the MNE invests in country B rather than A. This is because, fol-
lowing privatization, the incumbent firm produces a lower output and
becomes a weaker competitor for the MNE. However, in spite of its
FDI-attracting property, privatization does not necessarily make the
big country better off. On the contrary, whenever the domestic firm is
able to compete with the MNE and remains on the market after pri-
vatization (i.e., when c0 < 1/2), welfare always decreases as Figure 4
clearly shows. This allows us to state
Proposition 2 An FDI-attracting privatization decreases social wel-
fare whenever the privatized firm stays in the market. Privatization
may increase welfare only if it resolves in shutting down the (very inef-
ficient) public firm.
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Figure 4: Impact of privatization on country B’s welfare for n = 1, 2, 3
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that when privatization induces
the MNE to invest in the big country, the increase in profits for the
incumbent firm can never compensate for the loss in consumer surplus
of domestic residents. Hence, social welfare in the big country decreases.
This happens despite the fact that the privatized firm remains entirely
in the hands of domestic residents. Indeed, if we allow for the possibility
of foreign acquisition, the welfare-reducing impact of an FDI-attracting
privatization will be even stronger unless country B’s government is able
to sell the firm at a value which fully reflects its future profit earnings.
It is thus evident that the decision of privatizing the public firm entails
a trade-off for the big country between attractiveness and welfare.
7 Policy competition for FDI
In this Section, we extend the game theoretic description of the FDI
choice by introducing a pre-location stage in which the government of
the two countries simultaneously and independently offer to the MNE a
tax/subsidy package to which they are subsequently committed.17 The
MNE then makes her location choice on the basis not only of the (pre-
tax) profits but also of the fiscal policies of the competing countries. In
the last stage of the game the MNE and the incumbent compete on the
two markets, profits are realized, and taxes or subsidies are paid. We
solve our three-stage games with a public and with a private incumbent,
respectively, and then perform a comparative statics exercise to analyze
17The assumption of government commitment may be justified on the ground of
credibility. It prevents the trivial result in which the MNE does not invest in the
region in order to avoid the full seizure of its profits.
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the relationship between privatization and fiscal policies.
We assume that the country receiving FDI can levy a lump-sum tax
on the foreign firm’s profits or has to offer a lump-sum subsidy in order
to induce it to establish a production plant within its frontiers. We
denote country j’s fiscal policy by Sj , j = A,B. The equilibrium policy
will be a lump-sum tax when the host country already represents the
favourite location for the MNE in the absence of policy competition;
otherwise, it will be a lump-sum subsidy which makes the MNE prefer
a country to the other.
To analyze policy competition, we first need to identify the maximum
subsidy each country is willing to offer to the MNE. We define such a
subsidy as the country’s welfare gain of receiving the investment, i.e.,
Smax
j
≡ W j
j
−W k
j
, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k, with W k
j
denoting country
j’s welfare when FDI goes to country k (j, k = A,B). While welfare in
country B consists of consumer surplus and public firm’s profits as given
by (3), welfare in country A simply coincides with consumer surplus as
no local firm operates there prior to the MNE’s entry on the regional
market.
When countries compete to attract FDI, the MNE will invest in
country j if and only if
Πj + Smax
j
> Πk + Smax
k
, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k (6)
i.e., when profits from locating in j – inclusive of the lump-sum subsidy
country j offers – exceed those – subsidy inclusive – from investing in k.
Note, however, that because of different market size, cost-asymmetry,
and the presence of positive costs for intra-regional trade, the MNE may
prefer to invest in a country where part of its profits are taxed away in
spite of the fact that the other country offers a subsidy.
The equilibrium policy (subsidy or tax) is the result of an auction
where the country making the most attractive offer receives the invest-
ment by the MNE.18 When both countries offer the maximum subsidy
to attract FDI, country j wins the auction if condition (6) holds; how-
ever, country j need not actually pay the maximum subsidy it is willing
to offer but just the one which is necessary to out-bid the rival country,
18See the Appendix for a formal proof. The simultaneous auction equilibrium
outcome is equivalent to the one under Bertrand price competition for FDI between
the two countries.
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which is given by:19
S∗
j
≡ Πk + Smax
k
−Πj > 0, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k.
We now investigate how the interaction of fiscal and privatization
policies affects the attractiveness of the big country. Figure 5, which is
drawn for the case n = 2, is useful to illustrate the impact of tax/subsidy
competition and privatization both on the investment decision of the
MNE and on welfare of country B. First of all, it suggests that policy
competition allows the big country to reduce the negative impact on
welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. We summarize this result in
Proposition 3 Tax/subsidy competition decreases the negative impact
of an FDI-attracting privatization on social welfare.
The intuition is simple. Privatization dramatically increases the attrac-
tiveness of the big country. Hence, it is extremely beneficial for the
MNE to invest there instead of investing in the small country. This, in
turn, implies that country B can tax away part of the profit gain from
investing there (without changing the FDI decision of the foreign firm),
thereby increasing welfare above the before-privatization level.20
Figure 5 also shows that, after privatization, tax/subsidy competi-
tion enlarges the parameter space (τ, c0) where the MNE chooses to
invest in the small country. This is because the big country’s gain from
receiving FDI is lower than before privatization, which translates into
a less generous fiscal policy to attract FDI. This allows us to claim
Proposition 4 Following privatization, tax/subsidy competition incre-
ases the attractiveness of the small country.
19When country j represents the most attractive location for FDI without offering
any subsidy and despite the fact that country k offers its maximum affordable subsidy,
country j wins the auction by taxing away part of the MNE’s profits. In such a
situation, the lump-sum tax represents an entrance fee that country j charges the
firm for establishing its production plant there.
20Policy competition, however, does not prevent country B’s welfare to decrease
as a result of an FDI-attracting privatization when countries are symmetric (n = 1).
In such a situation, indeed, country B is always willing to offer a subsidy (in equi-
librium) which lowers its net-of-subsidy welfare below the corresponding level before
privatization.
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Figure 5: Impact of privatization and tax/subsidy competition for n = 2
After privatization, the big country is less eager to attract FDI than it
was before. Hence, the small country will represent a more attractive
location for the investment and can even succeed in hosting the MNE
by taxing away part of its profit gain from investing there. Intuitively,
the net effect on country B’s welfare of receiving FDI can now be neg-
ative since the gain in consumer surplus could not be sufficiently high
to counteract the loss in domestic firm’s profits. This implies that the
big country may be willing to tax the MNE in order to discourage it
from investing there and to protect the domestic industry from foreign
competition. Such a result puts forward an argument for the protection-
ist role of tax/subsidy competition for FDI. Moreover, it is consistent
with the finding by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) according to which the
big country may gain from not receiving FDI when its market size is
relatively large. However, our conclusions are more general than theirs
in that the privatized firm in the big country can be either as efficient
as or less efficient than the foreign MNE.
8 Other Issues
In this Section, we discuss the robustness of our results to some specific
issues in order to check to what extent they depend on the assumptions
of the model.
Firstly, privatization does not entail any efficiency gain in our set-
up.21 In spite of that, the fundamental trade-off between attractiveness
21As a matter of fact, the empirical evidence in this respect is mixed and the
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and welfare is robust to the inclusion of efficiency gains. Suppose that
the highest possible efficiency gains are achieved by privatization and
the incumbent becomes as efficient as the MNE. It is then easy to show
that for high values of c0 and τ , privatization with full efficiency gains
increases welfare but induces the MNE to invest in the other country,
while the opposite occurs for low values of the two parameters. Attrac-
tiveness and welfare may simultaneously increase only for intermediate
values. Furthermore, if we focus on consumer surplus only, the result is
even stronger: for any value of the parameters, privatization increases
the attractiveness of country B only if the market price increases and
consumers are worse off.22
Secondly, we have implicitly left out the possibility that consumers
- or other economic agents - take advantage of arbitrage opportunities.
If arbitrage were possible, instead, firms would be constrained in their
output choices. The arbitrage constraint would affect competition just
in the small country’s market before privatization. The public firm,
indeed, would behave less aggressively on that market - where it will
never export to. As a result, the relative profitability of investing in the
small country increases. But this, in turn, implies that privatization will
be more effective in improving the attractiveness of the big country.
Thirdly, one can call into question the absence of a budget constraint,
i.e., a break even condition, for the public firm. Public firms, indeed,
may be required to balance their budget in order to avoid the use of
distortionary taxation to cover their deficit. If we introduce such a
break even condition, the public firm’s maximization problem turns out
to be equivalent to a problem where the objective function is a weighted
average of welfare and profits. As a consequence, the firm’s behaviour
is somehow halfway between an unconstrained welfare maximizer and
a profit maximizer. In particular, the firm behaves either as in our
original set-up or less aggressively than before, thereby increasing the
attractiveness of the big country. For this reason, privatization becomes
variance of the results is substantial (see Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000). On the
other hand, there is general agreement on the fact that liberalization processes and
increased competition enhance firms’ efficiency. See, for example, the meta-reviews
of Villalonga (2000), Megginson and Netter (2001), and Willner (2001).
22We can also show that the latter result is robust to a departure from our linear
cost and demand setting and is valid whenever Cournot equilibrium exists and is
unique.
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a weaker instrument to attract FDI, and in such a sense, the break even
requirement can be viewed as a - milder - alternative to privatization.
Finally, we let firms compete in quantities - that are strategic sub-
stitutes - on the two markets. It is thus fair to wonder what happens
when the two firms’ products are strategic complements. To this end,
we consider a differentiated products duopoly with linear demand in
both markets where firms compete on prices.23 Straightforward com-
putations yield upward-sloping reaction functions for the MNE and for
the public - and the privatized - firm. Both firms will always be active in
the two markets as long as their products are sufficiently differentiated.
Moreover, the FDI decision of the MNE will now also depend on the
degree of product differentiation. In particular, the relative gain from
investing in B increases with market-size asymmetry only when trade
costs are high enough compared to the latter. In spite of that, it is pos-
sible to show that privatization always make it more profitable for the
MNE to invest in country B even in a model with strategic substitutes.
9 Conclusions
Several empirical studies about Latin America and Central and Eastern
Europe have put forward the FDI-attracting property of privatization
and, in particular, of domestic privatization programs. The main specu-
lative argument is that potential foreign investors interpret privatization
as a signal of a more favourable economic environment.
In this paper, we provide an alternative micro-founded explanation
of why privatization may attract foreign investors interested in entering
a regional market. By changing the objective of the incumbent firm
in the big country, privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a
less aggressive competitor for the MNE since profit-maximizing output
is lower than the welfare-maximizing one. This, in turn, translates
into larger profit opportunities for foreign competitors. The drawback
is that social welfare generally decreases. This attractiveness-welfare
trade-off has been illustrated in a simple model where we isolate the
main forces driving our results. Then, we have extended our analysis
to account for intra-regional exports in the presence of positive trade
23See Hindriks and Claude (2006) for a mixed oligopoly model with differentiated
products where firms compete either in prices or in quantities.
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costs, relative inefficiency of the incumbent firm in the big market, and
the possibility of lump-sum tax/subsidy competition between the two
countries to attract FDI. We have found that the attractiveness-welfare
trade-off resulting from an FDI-attracting privatization policy is still at
work in our extended set-up. Moreover, the possibly negative impact
on welfare may be mitigated in the presence of tax/subsidy competition
since the big country now has an instrument to tax away part of the
MNE’s profit gain from investing there.
To sum up, the presence of a public firm (although relatively ineffi-
cient) is a strong disincentive for a foreign firm to invest in the country
even if the latter represents a large market for its product. However,
privatization per se is not necessarily good news from the big coun-
try’s perspective as it might attract FDI while decreasing welfare. If
this were the case, the possibility of competing in fiscal policies may be
an improvement to the extent that it endows the big country with an
instrument which it can use either to protect its local producers from
foreign competitors or to extract part of the rents the foreign firm earns
by locating there.
Our findings thus shed light on the relationship between privatization
and fiscal policies aimed at attracting FDI. Privatization may represent
an alternative policy instrument that the government uses to improve
the attractiveness of a country for foreign investors. On the other hand,
fiscal policies might help reducing (or preventing) the negative impact
on domestic welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. This substi-
tutability/complementarity relationship between the two policies raises
the empirical testable prediction that privatization may be more effec-
tive in attracting FDI in regions where tax competition is more intense.
This appears to be a promising task for future research.
Appendix
FDI choice and market configurations
Depending on the values of c0 and τ , on whether FDI goes to country
A or B, and on the nature of the incumbent in B, different market
configurations may arise. We have depicted them in the parameter
space (τ, c0) with the four panels of Figure 1. In order to determine the
investment decision by the MNE, we superimpose the two top panels -
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in the case of a public incumbent - and the two bottom panels - in the
case of a privatized incumbent - respectively. This is shown in Figure 6.
Tables 1 and 2 then summarize the market configurations corresponding
to the different regions identified in the two panels of Figure 6.
Figure 6: FDI choice and market configurations
FDI in A FDI in B
Region Country A Country B Country A Country B
I MNE monopoly Cournot MNE monopoly Cournot
II MNE monopoly Cournot Cournot Cournot
III Cournot Cournot Cournot Cournot
IV Cournot Public Monopoly Cournot Cournot
V MNE monopoly Public Monopoly Cournot Cournot
VI MNE monopoly Public Monopoly MNE monopoly Cournot
Table 1: Regions and market configurations with a public incumbent
Investment decision with a public incumbent
Table 3 shows the values of equilibrium profits and welfare in the big
country when FDI goes to country A or B and the incumbent is a public
firm.
When FDI goes to A, the MNE behaves as a monopolist on that
market - producing qA
1A
= 12 - if the public firm does not export to A or
as a duopolist otherwise. Hence, the price to consumers in A is given by
pA =
1
2 or pA =
1+c0+τ
3 , respectively. In B, the public firm behaves as
a public monopoly if the MNE does not export to B or as a duopolist
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FDI in A FDI in B
Region Country A Country B Country A Country B
I MNE Monop. MNE Monop. MNE Monop. MNE Monop.
II MNE Monop. Cournot MNE Monop. MNE Monop.
III MNE Monop. Cournot MNE Monop. Cournot
IV MNE Monop. Cournot Cournot Cournot
V Cournot Cournot Cournot Cournot
VI MNE Monop. Privatized Monop. Cournot Cournot
VII MNE Monop. Privatized Monop. MNE Monop. Cournot
VIII MNE Monop. Privatized Monop. MNE Monop. MNE Monop.
Table 2: Regions and market configurations with a privatized incumbent
otherwise, implying pB = c0 or pB =
c0+τ
2 , respectively. When FDI
goes to B, instead, the MNE always behaves as a duopolist on that
market due to the presence of the incumbent public firm. Hence, the
price to consumers in B is always given by pB =
c0
2 . In A, the MNE
behaves as a monopolist - producing qB
1A
= 1−τ2 - if the public firm
does not export to that country or as a duopolist otherwise, implying
pA =
1+τ
2 or pA =
1+c0+2τ
3 , respectively. Straightforward computations
allow us to derive profits of the MNE from investing in A or in B and
the corresponding welfare in the two countries. Then, profit and welfare
differentials for the different regions of the left panel in Figure 6 can be
easily determined by using Table 3.
FDI in A
Market in A, B ΠA + F WA
B
Mon, CN 1
4
+
n(c0−τ)
2
4
n(2−c0−τ)
2
8
− n(1−c0)(c0−τ)
2
CN, CN
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
+
n(c0−τ)
2
4
WA
B
(Mon,CN) +
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
CN, Pub Mon
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
n(1−c0)
2
2
+
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
Mon, Pub Mon 1
4
n(1−c0)
2
2
FDI in B
Market in A, B ΠB + F WB
B
Mon, CN (1−τ)
2
4
+
nc2
0
4
n(2−c0)
2
8
− n(1−c0)c0
2
CN, CN
(1+c0−τ)
2
9
+
nc2
0
4
n(2−c0)
2
8
+
(1−2c0−τ)
2
9
− n(1−c0)c0
2
Table 3: Profits and welfare from FDI in A or in B with a public
incumbent
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Investment decision with a privatized incumbent
Table 4 shows the values of equilibrium profits and welfare in the big
country when FDI goes to country A or B and the incumbent is a
privatized firm.
Following privatization, the MNE’s behaviour on the small market is
the same as in the presence of a public firm. But the way firms compete
in the big country changes. When FDI goes to A, the privatized firm
behaves as a monopolist - producing qPA
0B
=
n(1−c0)
2 - if the MNE does
not export to B or as a duopolist otherwise, implying pB =
1+c0
2 or
pB =
1+c0+τ
3 , respectively. However, since the privatized firm does not
want to run losses, the MNE can enjoy monopoly power in B (even by
investing in A): whenever c0 >
1+τ
2 , the privatized firm indeed shuts
down and the MNE sets the monopoly price pB =
1+τ
2 and sells the
quantity qPA
1B
= n(1−τ)2 . When FDI goes to B, instead, the MNE always
behaves either as a duopolist or as a monopolist - producing qPB
1B
= n2 -
on that market, where the incumbent privatized firm produces as long
as it earns nonnegative profits. Hence, the price to consumers in B is
given by either pB =
1+c0
3 or pB =
1
2 . Straightforward computations
allow us to derive profits of the MNE from investing in A or in B and
the corresponding welfare in the two countries. Then, profit and welfare
differentials for the different regions of the right panel in Figure 6 can
be easily determined by using Table 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. This result follows from an intuitive and
straightforward argument. First of all, notice that public and privatized
firm behave identically on country A’s market. On the domestic market,
however, the privatized firm is a less aggressive competitor than the
public firm, so that the MNE faces a larger residual demand. Hence,
independently of where FDI goes to, local profits in B are higher when
the incumbent is the privatized firm. This, in turn, implies that the
gain in profits from investing in B over A is always bigger than in the
presence of the public firm.
Proof of Proposition 2. To understand and prove such a suffi-
cient condition, we can compare the worst situation - in terms of country
B’s welfare - before privatization with the best one after. Before pri-
vatization, when FDI goes to A, the worst it can happen is to have a
public monopoly serving the domestic market. As the public firm al-
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FDI in A
Market in A, B ΠA + F WA
B
Mon, CN 1
4
+
n(1+c0−2τ)
2
9
n(2−c0−τ)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0+τ)
2
9
CN, CN
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
+
n(1+c0−2τ)
2
9
WA
B
(Mon,CN) +
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
Mon, Mon 1
4
+ n(1−τ)
2
4
n(1−τ)2
8
Mon, Priv Mon 1
4
n(1−τ)2
8
+
n(1−c0)
2
4
FDI in B
Market in A, B ΠB + F WB
B
Mon, Mon (1−τ)
2
4
+ n
4
n
8
Mon, CN (1−τ)
2
4
+
n(1+c0)
2
9
n(2−c0)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0)
2
9
CN, CN
(1+c0−τ)
2
9
+
n(1+c0)
2
9
n(2−c0)
2
18
+
(1−2c0−τ)
2
9
+
n(1−2c0)
2
9
Table 4: Profits and welfare when FDI occurs either in A or in B with
a privatized incumbent
ways produces the same quantity in B, every market configuration in
which the MNE produces a positive quantity for that market increases
welfare since the gain in consumer surplus always exceeds the loss in
public firm’s profits. For the same reason, after privatization, the best
situation is to have Cournot duopoly on both countries’ markets. This
is so also because the privatized firm can never be a monopolist on the
foreign market.
We divide our proof in two steps: first, we isolate the pure privati-
zation effect on country B’s welfare; then, we consider the FDI-switch
effect on the privatized firm’s profits.
(i) When the incumbent firm is efficient enough (namely, c0 <
1
2), the
total quantity produced for the big country’s market by a public
monopoly, Q0M
B
= n (1− c0), is greater than that supplied by a
private duopoly, QPD
B
= n3 (2− c0). Then, the sum of consumer
surplus and incumbent firm’s profits on the domestic market is al-
ways smaller after privatization. Therefore, the pure privatization
effect is negative for any market configuration when c0 <
1
2 .
(ii) The FDI switch from A to B following privatization leads to a
profit loss on the domestic market and a profit gain on the foreign
market for the privatized firm. The overall effect turns out to be
30
negative because of the cost and of the market size effects. To
see this, suppose that countries are symmetric so that the market
size effect disappears. If the MNE invests in B rather than A, the
privatized firm’s profits are lower because the gain on the foreign
market does not compensate for the loss on the domestic market.
Introducing market-size asymmetry makes such an argument even
stronger since the loss occurs in the bigger market.
To sum up, both the pure privatization and the FDI-switch effects
have a negative impact on country B’s welfare, and the condition c0 <
1
2
ensures that the privatized firm stays in the market if the MNE invests
in B. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since the privatized firm’s reaction
function is downward sloping, any increase in the MNE’s output in B
reduces the privatized firm’s quantity with a negative effect both on
its profits and on country B’s consumer surplus. From the FDI-switch
effect (Proof of Proposition 2), we know that if the MNE invests in
B rather than A, the gain in privatized firm’s profits on the foreign
market does not compensate for the loss on the domestic market. This
is enough to conclude that ΠA + Smax
A
> ΠB + Smax
B
when ΠA = ΠB.
Equilibrium of the policy-competition-for-FDI game
The policy-competition-for-FDI game is equivalent to a competition
a` la Bertrand where countries A and B compete in prices and it is
characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria. Denoting by j the country
that receives FDI by the foreign firm and by k the other country (j, k =
A,B, j 6= k), the equilibrium can be generally defined as follows:
S∗
k
(
Sj
)
= , with  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
S∗
j
(S
k
) such that Πj
(
S∗
j
)
= Πk
(
Smax
k
)
and the proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand solution.
Suppose that condition (6) holds, so that for country j to win the
competition for FDI, it has to pay a positive subsidy to the foreign firm.
If this were the case, the equilibrium strategy pair of the two countries
31
is given by:
S∗
k
(
Sj
)
= , with  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
S∗
j
(
Smax
k
) ≡ Πk + Smax
k
−Πj > 0
For country k, any bid  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
is a best reply to country j’s
equilibrium strategy since k’s payoff is always nil. Indeed, it can never
attract the foreign investor even by offering its maximum subsidy. For
country j, any other bid S′
j
(·) < S∗
j
(
Smax
k
)
is not an equilibrium strat-
egy since country k will have the opportunity of attracting FDI by of-
fering the foreign firm Smax
k
, which would imply Πk
(
Smax
k
)
> Πj
(
S′
j
)
.
By contrast, any other bid S′
j
(·) > S∗
j
(
Smax
k
)
is not a best reply to
S∗
k
(
Sj
)
because it leaves some extra-money on the table, i.e., to the
foreign firm.
The same argument applies when the profit gain from investing in
country j is so large that country j can win the competition for FDI
by levying a positive lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profits in spite
of the fact that country k offers its maximum subsidy. In this case, the
equilibrium strategy pair of the two countries is given by:
S∗
k
(
Sj
)
= , with  ∈ (0, Smax
k
)
T ∗
j
(
Smax
k
) ≡ Πj − (Πk + Smax
k
)
> 0
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